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ZONING SPEECH ON THE INTERNET: 
A LEGAL AND TECHNICAL MODEL 
Lawrence Lessig* 
Paul Resnick** 
Speech, it is said,1 divides into three sorts - (1) speech that every­
one has a right to (political speech, speech about public affairs); (2) 
speech that no one has a right to (obscene speech, child porn); and (3) 
speech that some have a right to but others do not (in the United 
States, Ginsberg2 speech, or speech that is "harmful to minors," to 
which adults have a right but kids do not). Speech-protective regimes, 
on this view, are those where category (1) speech predominates; 
speech-repressive regimes are those where categories (2) and (3) pre­
vail. 
This divide has meaning for speech and regulation within a single 
jurisdiction, but it makes less sense across jurisdictions. For when 
viewed across jurisdictions, most controversial speech falls into cate­
gory (3) - speech that is permitted to some in some places, but not to 
others in other places. What constitutes "political speech" in the 
United States (Nazi speech) is banned in Germany; what constitutes 
"obscene" speech in Tennessee is permitted in Holland; what consti­
tutes porn in Japan is child porn in the United States; what is "harmful 
to minors" in Bavaria is Disney in New York. Every jurisdiction con­
trols access to some speech3 - what we call "mandatory access con-
* Jack N. and Lillian R. Berkman Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal Studies, Harvard 
Law School. B.A.IB.S. 1983, Pennsylvania; M.A. 1986, Cambridge; J.D. 1989, Yale. - Ed. 
Thanks to Lorrie Cranor for initially suggesting the symmetry between tagging speech and 
tagging people. Thanks also to Robert Cooter, Mark Lemley, Richard Posner, and the 
GALA Workshop at Boalt Law School for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Karen 
King and Alexander Macgillivray provided valuable research assistance. An earlier version 
of this paper has been published as "The Architectures of Mandated Access Controls," in 
COMPETITION, REGULATION AND CONVERGENCE: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1998 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY REsEARCH CONFERENCE (Sharon Eisner Gillett & Ingo 
Vogelsang eds., 1999). 
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1. See Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 
JURIMETRICS J. 629, 638-39 (1998). 
2. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
3. We reserve the term "censorship" for blanket restrictions on the distribution of 
speech that apply regardless of the recipient or the context. Access control is a broader con­
cept that includes not only censorship but also restrictions on speech that may depend on the 
recipient or context. 
395 
396 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:395 
trols" - but what that speech is differs from jurisdiction to jurisdic­
tion. 
This diversity creates a problem (for governments at least) when 
we consider speech within cyberspace. Within cyberspace, mandated 
access controls are extremely difficult. If access control requires 
knowing (a) the identities of the speaker and receiver, (b) the jurisdic­
tions of the speaker and receiver, and (c) the content of the speech at 
issue, then as cyberspace was initially designed, none of these data are 
easily determined. As a result, real space laws do not readily translate 
into the context of cyberspace. 
One possible response to the change caused by the initial architec­
ture of the Internet ("Net") would have been for governments simply 
to give up on access controls. Experience suggests that this is unlikely. 
As the popularity of the Net has grown, governments have shown an 
increasing interest in reestablishing mandated access controls over cer­
tain kinds of speech now published on the Internet. In the United 
States, this speech is sex-4 or spam5-related; in Germany, it is both sex­
and Nazi-related;6 in parts of Asia, it is anything critical of Asian gov­
ernments.7 Across the world, governments seek to reregulate access 
to speech in cyberspace, so as to reestablish local control. 
We take as given this passion for reregulation. It features promi­
nently in the current political reality of cyberspace. This reality should 
push us to consider the options that regulators face - not because 
regulators need encouragement, but because we should understand 
the consequences of any particular regulatory strategy. Some strate­
gies pose greater costs than others; some strike at more fundamental 
features of the Net than do others. We aim to understand the trade­
offs that this reregulation presents. 
This inquiry is particularly salient in the United States just now. In 
what may have become a biannual event, the United States Congress 
in 1998 passed its second attempt at regulating "indecent speech" on 
the Net - the Child Online Protection Act8 ("COPA"). Its first stat­
ute, the Communications Decency Act of 19969 ("CDA"), was struck 
4. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, invalidated by Reno 
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Child Online Protection Act, § 1403, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 
(Supp. 1999). 
5. "Spam" signifies unsolicited commercial email. See infra Part IV. 
6. See Kim L. Rappaport, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in 
Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, 
13 AM. U. INT'LL. REV. 765, 766-67, 788-90 (1998). 
7. See Geremie R. Barme & Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China, WIRED, June 1997, 
at 138, 147; Philip Shenon, 2-Edged Sword: Asian Regimes on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, May 
29, 1995, at 1. 
8. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (Supp. 1999). 
9. Communications Decency Act of 1996, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, invalidated by Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
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down by the Supreme Court in 1997.10 Now two years later, a federal 
district court in Philadelphia has enjoined enforcement of COPA.11 
And if the ACLU succeeds in striking this statute, Congress no doubt 
will be at it again. Among the headaches of Y2K will be another 
CDA; and among the more significant (if repetitive) cases of 2001 will 
be ACLU v. [the next attorney general]. 
Congress may never pass a statute that satisfies the Court,12 but we 
think it could. There exists a type of "decency act," which we sketch 
here, that would pass constitutional muster. That act is not COPA. 
To see why this "decency act" would be constitutional where COP A 
was not, and to understand this alternative act, requires a broader 
view. It requires an analysis that makes clear the different values at 
stake. 
Our aim in this essay is to provide just such a perspective. We of­
fer in Part I a model of mandated access control that will clarify the 
issues in play. While this model will help resolve the constitutional 
questions raised by COPA, it will also help see the issues that man­
dated access controls present more generally. Given that different ju­
risdictions will want different restrictions, and given that those restric­
tions would be differentially costly, we provide in Part II a map of the 
different architectures and assignments of responsibility that might ef­
fect these restrictions. We then consider the trade-offs among these 
alternatives - both generally, and in particular in the American con­
text. 
This approach is a type of sensitivity analysis. Regulation, in the 
view that we take of it here, is a function of both law and the architec­
tures of the Internet within which law must function. By "architec­
tures" we mean (a) the Internet's technical protocols (for example, 
TCP/IP), (b) its standards and standard applications (for example, 
browsers or a digital certificate standard), and ( c) its entrenched struc­
tures of governance and social patterns of usage that themselves are 
not easily changed - or at least not without coordinated action by 
many parties. These architectures are not fixed. They change, partly 
in response to both direct and indirect regulation by law. Thus in Part 
II we ask first how access can be controlled given the existing array of 
legal and architectural constraints. We then consider how changes in 
the current array might yield a different mix of costs and benefits. 
We evaluate the various outcomes of these different legal and ar­
chitectural choices along four separate dimensions. For any particular 
mix, we consider, first, the effectiveness at controlling access; second, 
10. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
11. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
12. A cynic might believe that this repetition is no accident. After all, Congress gets 
rewarded for what it passes, not what sticks. Protecting kids is great politics. Why do it only 
once, the cynic might ask, when one can do it every two years? 
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the cost to participants, whether sender, receiver, or intermediary; 
third, the costs to a system of "free speech" that such access controls 
impose; and fourth, other second-order effects, including in particular 
how different architectures might enable other regulation, beyond the 
specific access control that a given change was designed to enable. 
For concreteness, we will focus on sexually explicit speech. We 
pick this type of speech because, in the American context at least, 
there exist at least two permissible levels of regulation for such speech. 
Some sexually explicit speech is prohibited generally (obscene speech, 
child porn); some sexually explicit speech is prohibited only to minors 
(speech that is "harmful to minors"); and the balance of sexually ex­
plicit speech is permitted to everyone.13 This range of regulations will 
therefore illustrate the more general problem of access control across 
jurisdictions. 
We then apply our model to COPA. COPA has a significantly 
narrower reach than the original CDA. Although Congress was, we 
believe, responsive to the Supreme Court's opinion in Reno, there is a 
structural feature of COPA that still renders it unconstitutional, at 
least when compared to a second possible statute that would have 
achieved Congress's legitimate end.14 Those attacking COPA are not 
in a position to suggest this alternative, because they believe that pri­
vate regulation is better than any law. But while we agree that private 
regulation may be better than COP A, we will suggest that private 
regulation may be more costly for free speech interests than the alter­
native regulation that we sketch here. 
Part III focuses on this cost differential. There we consider the 
unintended consequences of the various regulatory strategies pro­
posed. We argue that any reckoning of the costs of mandated access 
control must consider these secondary costs (and benefits) as well. In 
our view, these have been ignored in the debate so far. Yet arguably, 
they will be the most significant. Long after the "problem" of "inde­
cent speech" is solved, the consequences of our choices to deal with 
indecent speech - these secondary effects - will continue to influ­
ence the culture of the Net. Legal and policy analyses would do well 
to account in the first place for these secondary effects. 
The last section, Part IV, applies the same model to efforts to con­
trol "unsolicited commercial email," or "spam." The motivation for 
spam control differs from the reasons for controlling "indecency." 
Spam control protects recipients from unwanted information pushed 
into their mailboxes rather than preventing them from pulling inf or­
mation that they want. Our model and analysis, however, apply 
equally well to controlling spam, and shed light on the likely effective-
13. See the cases cited in Lessig, supra note 1, at 638 nn.26 & 27. 
14. We describe this model below in Section II.D. Congress was aware of this alterna­
tive. See 144 CONG. REC. S12795 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (comments of Sen. Leahy). 
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ness and side effects of various legislative and architectural changes 
that have been proposed. 
I. A MODEL OF ACCESS CONTROL 
A. Elements 
In our model of mandated access control ("MAC"), we consider 
three relevant actors - a sender, a recipient, and an intermediary. 
The sender makes available the relevant speech; the recipient gets ac­
cess to the relevant speech; and an intermediary is an entity that 
stands between the two. As these definitions suggest, nothing in our 
description hangs upon whether the sender actually sends material to 
the recipient, or upon the mode with which the recipient gains access. 
These actors, we will assume, know different things about the 
speech that is to be regulated. We assume the sender knows about the 
contents of the item being sent. We assume the recipient has informa­
tion about her own identity and residence. And finally we assume the 
intermediary has information neither about the content, nor about 
who the recipient is or where she resides. Obviously, these assump­
tions are not necessary. A sender might not have knowledge about 
the speech she makes available; and a recipient may not know where 
or who she is. But we assume a general case. 
Given this mix of knowledge, a government effects mandated ac­
cess control through four separate steps. It first defines which transac­
tions are illegal, where "transaction" means the exchange of speech of 
a certain kind between two kinds of individuals. Second, it assigns re­
sponsibility to one or more actors to effect that restriction. Third, it 
creates a regime to detect when assigned responsibilities are violated. 
And fourth, it sets punishments for these violations. In the balance of 
this Part, we sketch issues relevant to each of these elements of a 
regulatory regime, and we conduct, for each element, a sensitivity 
analysis. 
B. Step One: Defining Blocked Exchanges 
A regulatory regime first defines a set of illegal transactions, or 
"blocked exchanges." The criteria for deciding whether an exchange 
is blocked include: (1) the type of speech item exchanged ("I''); (2) 
the recipient ("R"); and (3) the rules of the recipient's jurisdiction 
("l"). We can state this relation as follows: 
(a) Blocked Exchange: B(l, R, J) = (Y, NJ 
Where I= item type, R =recipient type, and J =jurisdiction type. B(x,y,z) is a function 
determining whether exchange of the speech item is blocked. If the exchange is 
blocked, the function yields Y; if the exchange is not blocked, the function yields N. 
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Stated alternatively, a blocked exchange equates with access to a given 
item type, by a given individual within a given jurisdiction, that the law 
deems illegal. 
Within this model, there may be "floor" recipients and "floor" ju­
risdictions. In the specific context of sexually explicit speech within 
American jurisdictions, children represent a type of floor recipient 
(anything permitted to children is permitted to adults as well), and a 
Bible Belt small town may be a floor jurisdiction (anything permitted 
there would be permissible everywhere). More formally, with J1 de­
noting a floor jurisdiction: 
(b) Floor Recipient. For all!, J: B(I, child,]) =Nimplies for allR, B(I, R, J) =N 
(c) Floor Jurisdiction. For all!, R: B(I, R, J) =Nimplies for all], B(I, R, J) =N 
The two floors can be combined. Anything that the law permits to 
children in a floor jurisdiction it will permit to everyone in every juris­
diction: 
(d) Floorrecipient and For all I: B(I, child, l) = N implies for all J and R, 
jurisdiction. B(I, R, J) = N 
In the general case, either the sender's or the recipient's jurisdic­
tion may determine that an exchange is blocked. United States laws 
regulating cryptography, for example, restrict a sender's right to send 
certain encryption-related material to another jurisdiction; French 
cryptography laws regulate a receiver's right to receive such material. 
For simplicity, however, we will focus only on exchanges blocked by 
the recipient jurisdiction. Our analysis would apply with equal force if 
the exchange were blocked in the sender's jurisdiction because, aside 
from the effect on enforcement, the factors analyzed here do not de­
pend on whose jurisdiction regulates. 
A jurisdiction,15 on this model of blocked transactions, may specify 
that a particular transaction must be blocked in at least two different 
ways: 
1. The jurisdiction might publish criteria defining what must be 
blocked, but require a judgment by the parties about how to 
apply that criteria. The jurisdiction may or may not then hold 
parties responsible for correctly making such judgments prior 
to a determination by the regulating jurisdiction. 
2. The jurisdiction might classify specific items as acceptable or 
blocked for particular recipient types, or, alternatively, create a 
list of prohibited speech. Determinations of acceptability could 
occur through a judicial or administrative process, or the juris­
diction could delegate its authority to an independent rating 
15. There is an important ambiguity in the concept of "jurisdiction" that we ignore here. 
Some rules depend upon where the person acts, rather than where the person is a citizen. If 
the drinking age in one state is 21, it does not matter that in the jurisdiction where X comes 
from, the drinking age is 18. But some rules may depend upon where someone comes from. 
We do not distinguish those cases in this version of the argument. 
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service.16 A jurisdiction could even rely on a computer program 
to provide an initial classification of the speech at issue, and 
publish that classification as a preclearance, perhaps with a 
stipulation that the initial classification might be changed in the 
future after human review. 
In the American context, jurisdictions ordinarily follow the procedure 
of case (1). If a jurisdiction follows case (2), publishing a list of 
blocked items for a given recipient type, then the list of items must, 
ordinarily, be judicially specified.17 If, however, the lists are used on a 
voluntary basis for preclearance of acceptable items, nonjudicial de­
terminations might be acceptable, a possibility we will analyze in Part 
II. 
C. Step Two: Assignments of Responsibility 
In the second step the regulator must define how best to allocate 
responsibility among actors to assure that access is controlled. In ad­
dition to the sender and recipient, it will sometimes be useful to distin­
guish among intermediaries. Internet Access Providers, such as AOL 
or AT&T WorldNet, serve as intermediaries closest to the senders and 
recipients. Internet backbone providers, such as WorldCom and 
Sprint, carry data between access providers. Responsibility for con­
trolling access could be assigned either exclusively to one actor or 
jointly to any combination. We analyze only exclusive assignments of 
responsibility for blocking, as opposed to shared responsibility, though 
we do consider requiring other parties to provide information to the 
blocking party. 
By hypothesis, no party knows enough to determine whether a 
particular exchange should be blocked.18 The law must therefore cre­
ate an incentive for parties to produce sufficient information to de­
termine whether access should be blocked. 
16. An example would be Cyber Patrol's CyberNOT list. See Cyber Patrol Main Page 
(visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.cyberpatrol.com/>. 
17. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 {1972), which held that an injunc­
tion could be used so long as adequate procedures to determine obscenity had been used. 
This would probably not be permitted absent a judicial finding. See Rowan v. United States 
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738-39 (1970). 
18. Again, the sender does not know the recipient; the recipient does not know the con­
tent of the item; the intermediary does not know either. See supra Section I.A. This does 
not mean that there would not be extreme, and therefore easy, cases. The speaker would 
certainly know, therefore, whether some kinds of speech were highly likely to be permitted. 
Banalities about the weather constitute fairly safe speech acts anywhere; sadistic child porn 
is fairly unsafe in most jurisdictions. 
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The law ordinarily creates incentives through property or liability 
regimes. While a property regime in this area seems conceivable,19 we 
focus here on a liability regime. The law can create an incentive to 
produce the information necessary to determine whether an exchange 
should be blocked by assigning liability to an actor for failing to block 
properly a transaction,20 or by setting a default rule about whether to 
block properly a transaction when there is uncertainty.21 
We consider two such defaults.22 Under the first default, the 
sender incurs liability if she enters a transaction without reliable indi­
cators that the transaction was in fact legal, and that transaction is 
later determined to be illegal. We call this the "prohibited unless 
permitted" rule. Because liability turns on the steps taken to comply 
with the law, it is distinct from a prior restraint.23 
Under the second rule, the sender incurs liability only if she enters 
a transaction in the face of indicators that the transaction was in fact 
illegal, and that transaction is later determined to be illegal. We call 
this the "permitted unless prohibited" rule, and it is equivalent to a 
rule punishing a specific intent to violate the law.24 One modification 
of this second rule would hold the sender responsible if the sender 
should have known that the transaction was illegal. This would com-
19. For an excellent analysis of a property regime for dealing with access control, see 
Developments in the Law - The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1634-57 
(1999). 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. By "uncertainty" we mean simply not having a given type of information - for ex­
ample, information about the jurisdiction from which a receiver comes. 
22. We do not claim at this point that either default would, for all types of speech, be 
constitutional under the U.S. Constitution. Nor do we speak about the burdens of proof un­
der a particular statute. We assume throughout that the state bears the burden for all ele­
ments of the charge. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 {1959) {finding it unconstitutional 
to hold a bookseller criminally liable regardless of the bookseller's knowledge of the ob· 
scene contents of books sold). Rather than claim what is constitutionally possible, our de­
faults help clarify the relationship between the proscription and uncertainty. Like Schauer's 
article, our objective is to further explore this relationship, and the constitutional implica­
tions of uncertainty. See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unravel­
ing the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 725-29 {1978). 
23. It is distinct because there exists no requirement to not send, but rather simply a 
punishment for sending without indication that the sending is legal. We concede this is a 
fine line, but with our defaults we aim, as we have explained above, not so much to limn the 
contours of American constitutionalism, but to understand the relationship between these 
rules and uncertainty. 
24. The Model Penal Code equates specific intent with "acting knowingly." The rele­
vant section reads: 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is 
aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and 
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain 
that his conduct will cause such a result. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2){b) {1962). 
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port with a negligence standard, and we consider this alternative 
where relevant in the analysis below.25 
These default rules will have significant consequences for behavior 
if there is systematic uncertainty about either the nature of Internet 
content or the character of Internet users (as of course there is). In 
cases of uncertainty, the "prohibited unless permitted" rule will be 
overbroad (it will block more speech than the state has a legitimate 
interest in blocking), while the "permitted unless prohibited" rule will 
be ineffective (since there will be insufficient incentive to discover the 
relevant information about what speech should be blocked).26 Thus in 
the face of uncertainty, the default rule will be important, especially if 
one default is constitutionally compelled. 
We will focus on changes in the architecture that might reduce the 
uncertainty. Stated abstractly, these changes will either tag speech, or 
tag people. If speech is tagged, then an intermediary or recipient can 
more easily determine item types and block accordingly; if people are 
tagged, then an intermediary or sender can more easily identify recipi­
ent and jurisdiction types and block accordingly. 
D. Steps Three and Four: Monitoring and Enforcement 
In the final two steps the regulator must first devise schemes for 
monitoring compliance and, second, implement schemes of enforce­
ment. In both cases where the target of regulation sits, relative to the 
regulating regime, is an important factor in selecting among regulatory 
regimes. And in the case of monitoring, the technology used to effect 
the access control will significantly alter the costs of monitoring. Some 
technologies, that is, would be open for an automated and random 
verification; others would not. 
The major issues for enforcement all involve the question of 
whether the regulating jurisdictions can easily, or cheaply, reach the 
target of enforcement. We assume there are more receivers than 
senders, so one might believe targeting senders would be cheaper than 
targeting receivers. This, however, becomes complicated when the 
sender operates from outside the regulating jurisdiction, making the 
sender sometimes legally, or at least practically, beyond the reach of 
the regulating jurisdiction. The cost of enforcement against these ali­
ens may make it cheaper to enforce a rule against receivers than send­
ers. 
Whether more receivers or listeners exist, however, there are cer­
tainly fewer intermediaries than either. Intermediaries, as we discuss 
25. See infra Section II.A. 
26. The REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §282 (1965) defines negligence as "con­
duct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against 
unreasonable risk of harm." 
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below, could be good targets of regulation, even though they possess 
even less information than either the sender or receiver. Again, the 
savings in enforcing a rule against them may outweigh the cost of their 
obtaining the necessary information. Thus from a social cost perspec­
tive, making them liable could be efficient.27 
II. ALLOCATING RESPONSIBILITY 
We now consider the consequences, under each of our two default 
rules, of allocating responsibility among our three actors - first to the 
sender, then to the recipient, and finally, to the intermediary. Within 
each allocation, we also consider how changes in existing law and 
Internet architecture might more efficiently achieve the aim of access 
control - more control at less free speech cost. This comprises our 
"sensitivity analysis" within each allocation. Finally, at the end of this 
Section, we consider a "mixed" strategy for the special case of "inde­
cent speech" and children. 
A. Sender Responsible for Blocking Access 
Our first rule would make the sender responsible for controlling 
access. To comply with this rule, the sender must determine both the 
law of the jurisdiction of the recipient and, depending upon that law, 
certain characteristics of the recipient. Material considered "harmful 
to minors" present the obvious case, because many states require that 
providers of such material keep it from kids.28 But the rule anticipates 
more general possibilities: rules regulating SEC filings, for example, 
make the content of that filing depend upon whether the reader is or is 
not a U.S. citizen. 
Under the present Internet architecture, both determinations en­
tail high costs. There is no simple way to identify the jurisdiction 
within which the recipient resides,29 and no cheap way to be certain of 
27. Our conclusion, however, will be that the social costs of enabling blocking by inter­
mediaries are in fact quite high. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60. 
28. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 887 & n.2 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
29. A web server, for example, knows the IP address of the client computer that re­
quests a web page, but usually knows little else about the recipient. An IP address does not 
readily identify a geographic location, because the administrative practices surrounding IP 
address allocation have not been based solely on geography. By analogy with the telephone 
numbering system, IP addresses have been allocated more like 800-numbers than like the 
numbers in regular area codes. Moreover, there is currently no single up-to-date database 
indicating the location of the computer using each IP address. (In practice, to facilitate 
routing, address allocations do roughly follow geography, which means that such a database 
might not be too unwieldy if it were assembled.) An IP address does not even uniquely 
identify a recipient computer, since dial-up connections through an Internet service provider 
typically are assigned a different address each time they dial. 
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characteristics of the individual. The rule would therefore be quite 
costly to a speaker - unconstitutionally costly, according to Reno v. 
ACLU, though differently costly under each of our two default rules. 
Under the "prohibited unless permitted" rule, the cost falls on 
"free speech" interests. The burden of determining eligibility will 
likely create a significant chill on the speaker's speech.30 The sender 
would have to take steps outside of the architecture of the Net to de­
termine where a recipient is - by verifying an address, for example, 
or by using an area code on a telephone number as a proxy for the lo­
cation. And the sender would need to rely upon proxies from creden­
tials (such as a credit card) to guess whether the individual is of a 
proper age or not. 
The United States Supreme Court has permitted this regime in the 
context of obscenity, where the sender must determine both the juris­
diction relevant for the recipient and the law of that jurisdiction.31 It 
has not directly addressed the same question in the context of speech 
"harmful to minors" on the Internet, where the sender must deter­
mine, in addition to the jurisdictional information, the age of the re­
cipient. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court did cite the burden of verifica­
tion as one reason that the CDA's "indecency" provision was 
constitutionally suspect.32 But Reno did not consider the "harmful to 
minors" standard - or, as described by some, the obscene-as-to­
minors standard33 - and the Supreme Court has not clearly indicated 
that the test would be different. 
If, on the other hand, the rule is "permitted unless prohibited," the 
cost lies in the effectiveness of the regulation. Under this rule, the ex­
isting architecture would make any access control ineffective. While 
in real space, certain facts about an individual are unavoidably self­
authenticating (a ten-year-old boy does not look much like a twenty­
year-old man), in cyberspace, such facts are not. To determine either 
the jurisdiction or the age of the recipient requires affirmative steps by 
the sender. If no obligation to take such steps exists, or if no require-
30. Though the use of the word has become quite general, we attempt in this essay to 
follow Schauer's definition of "chill," which refers "only to those examples of deterrence 
which result from the indirect governmental restriction of protected expression." Schauer, 
supra note 22, at 693. 
31. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-06 (1974). 
32 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 876. 
33. See, e.g., Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389, 
1394 (8th Cir. 1986); see also M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721F.2d 1281, 1287-91, 1295 (10th 
Cir. 1983) (upholding a requirement that obscene-as-to-minors magazines be placed in 
"blinder racks"). Under Ginsberg, "minors may constitutionally be denied access to mate­
rial that is obscene as to minors," but adults may not. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 895 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633 (1968)). Material is obscene as to minors if it is patently offen­
sive, appeals to minors' prurient interest, and completely lacks socially redeeming value for 
minors. See id. 
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ment exists to block unless such steps are taken, then the rule will not 
effect the intended access control. 
The existing architecture of the Internet therefore creates a great 
burden for the sender if the default is "prohibited unless permitted,'' 
and it defeats access control if the default is "permitted unless prohib­
ited." 
1. Sensitivity 
Some of the burden on the sender could be reduced by architec­
tural and legal changes. In this Section we describe four, and consider 
the potential costs and benefits of each. 
The first two changes involve ways to identify more cheaply facts 
about the recipient. The two facts unknown by the sender are the ju­
risdiction of the recipient, and characteristics of the recipient (that she 
is, for example, over eighteen). The changes described here would fa­
cilitate the sender knowing both facts at a relatively cheap cost. 
The first technique relies on digital certificates.34 In the standard 
model of certificates, certificates identify who someone is. They are 
digital objects cryptographically signed by a certificate authority, a 
widely trusted entity that verifies an individual or organizational iden­
tity before issuing a certificate. The dominant use of such certificates 
today is to certify the identity of the holder.35 This is the model, for 
example, of the VeriSign Digital ID, which VeriSign, one of the best­
known certificate authorities on the Internet, describes as a "driver['s] 
license[] for the Internet."36 
But there is no reason that the same technology could not be used 
to certify facts about the holder - or, more generally, to certify any 
assertion made by the signer. In our case, a signing certificate author­
ity could then certify that Xis from Massachusetts, and that X is over 
the age of eighteen, without identifying who X is.37 Senders would 
then examine these certificates before granting access to regulable 
speech. Access would then be granted without a cumbersome system 
of passwords or IDs. 
34. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in 
Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49 (1996) (describing digital certification techniques). 
35. See id. at 58-62. 
36. See VeriSign Digital ID Center (visited Sept. 16, 1999) <http://www.verisign.com/ 
client/index.html>. 
37. David Chaum was an early proponent of such characteristics certificates rather than 
identity certificates. See David Chaum, Security Without Identification: Transaction Systems 
to Make Big Brother Obsolete, 28 COMM. ACM 1030 (1985). 
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We can call this a "credentialling" solution.38 It requires that the 
sender make certain judgments about the speech at stake; but it allows ' 
the sender to rely upon representations about the jurisdiction and the 
recipient that are necessary to determine whether an exchange is or is 
not blocked. 
Under a "prohibited unless permitted" regime, access would be 
blocked except to those who could show that they carry the proper 
credentials. In the case of "harmful to minors" speech, the credential 
would be an adult ID indicating that the recipient is over eighteen. 
Recipients interested in receiving restricted materials will have an in­
centive to show such credentials. All else being equal, certificates 
would lower the cost of such a showing, and therefore reduce the bur­
den, and hence chill, of the access control regime. Moreover, the bur­
den on individuals under such a regime would be lower than under a 
regime where they must show a credit card or other form of identifica­
tion. The cost of a certificate should be less than the cost of a card, 
and the possibilities for anonymity should be greater. 
While no legal mandate on recipients would be needed to encour­
age showing age or jurisdiction certificates under a "prohibited unless 
permitted" regime, sanctions would be needed to reduce fraudulent 
use of certificates. If, for example, it were easy to obtain an anony­
mous adult-ID certificate, one might imagine a black market emerg­
ing, with children acquiring certificates from adult intermediaries. 
This potentiality creates a practical limitation on any regime where a 
credential grants access, since it creates an incentive to construct a 
false credential. One way to limit the transferability of anonymous 
certificates would be to include an IP address in the certificate, so that 
it could only be used with a single computer, or for the duration of a 
single dial-up connection if an access provider assigns different ad­
dresses for each dial-up session. (Each computer on the Internet has a 
numeric identifier, called an IP address.) Another technique for lim­
iting transfers would be to make the certificates traceable, so that if 
abuse is detected, the identity of the original acquirer could be re­
vealed, and that person could be punished. 
Alternatively, widespread use of digital certificates could also im­
prove the effectiveness of a "permitted unless prohibited" regime, by 
providing senders with enough information to block correctly ex­
changes that would otherwise have been permitted by default.39 
To minimize the burden of this rule, the rule could require that the 
recipient provide the certificate only if the server asks, and the server 
38. Note that even though the technology for this solution is already in place, we refer to 
it as a possible architectural change because a widespread change in social practices would 
be necessary for the technology to be used in this way. 
39. One version of this regime would have recipients provide child-IDs, which we dis­
cuss below when considering COP A. See infra Section II.D. 
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would be required to ask only if the material is illegal in at least one 
jurisdiction. This regime would still somewhat burden those recipients 
living in jurisdictions where the speech was wholly legal; its viability 
would rest then upon the significance of that burden.40 Alternatively, 
the rule could require that intermediaries provide or assure that users 
have valid certificates. In this case, the appropriate intermediaries 
would be the Internet Access Providers who serve recipients. If the 
state requires such intermediaries to assure the supply of certificates, 
then the costs of monitoring and compliance might be lower than if 
the same role were performed by the state. The intermediary has an 
advantage not in executing the primary conduct - certainly receivers 
stand in a better position to certify than intermediaries - but in as­
suring that the primary conduct is properly regulated. 
A second architectural change to help the sender identify the re­
cipient's jurisdiction would be an IP map - a table that would give a 
rough approximation of the location of the recipient's computer.41 No 
doubt the map could not be perfect, and senders or recipients could 
use proxies to escape the consequences of the map. But in the main, 
the map might sufficiently segregate restrictive jurisdictions from non­
restrictive ones. 
An IP map would provide benefits over a certificate system. Un­
der the "prohibited unless permitted" regime, an IP map may burden 
speech even less than the certificate regime, since the cost to the re­
cipient of this form of identification is zero, and the processing costs to 
the server would be lower than processing a certificate. The "permit­
ted unless prohibited" regime becomes more effective as well, since 
n.ow the sender has an assured way of knowing the jurisdiction into 
which the material is being sent, though not information about the re­
cipient's age or other characteristics. 
But there are important social costs associated with this IP-to­
geography mapping that flow from its generality. Since jurisdiction 
identification would be determinable with any IP transaction, the re­
gime would effect jurisdiction identification independent of the kind 
of speech being accessed. This raises obvious privacy concerns, which 
might be mitigated by structures that would limit the use of the map-
40. Another possibility would be for the server to send a request of the form "if you are 
in jurisdiction X or Y and you are under 18, please provide a child ID," which would further 
reduce the burden of the system. 
41. Currently, the InterNIC maintains a database of the assignations of IP addresses to 
organizations. This database is public, and a copy of it may be queried from any computer 
on the Internet Unfortunately, some entries in the database are incomplete or out of date, 
and they do not necessarily identify the location of computers using the IP addresses. It has 
been suggested, however, that such a database be used as a starting point for developing an 
IP to jurisdiction mapping. See Philip McCrea et al., Blocking Content on the Internet: A 
Technical Perspective, app. 5 (visited Sept. 16, 1999) <http://www.noie.gov.au/>. 
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ping for specific purposes. But for obvious reasons, it would be diffi­
cult to limit the use of this information. 
The final two architectural changes would aid senders in classifying 
their speech according to the categories of various jurisdictions. The 
first is an automated preclearance technology. While we presume that 
the sender knows about its speech, the sender may not understand the 
classification scheme of every legal jurisdiction. Preclearance of the 
sender's materials can reduce or eliminate the uncertainty. Judicial 
preclearance would entail high costs. Determinations could be per­
formed more cheaply, however, by third parties or even computer 
programs, but there would inevitably be some errors when compared 
with the gold standard of judicial determinations. Thus, in the United 
States at least, a judicial determination is required to block exchanges 
proactively.42 
A voluntary preclearance regime, however, might be acceptable, 
even with nonjudicial determinations. Suppose that the government 
promised not to prosecute a sender for exchanges that had been pre­
cleared as acceptable. Uncertainty would remain about other items. 
It would seem initially that such a voluntary regime would be speech­
enhancing. On the margin, if a speaker could be certain that her 
speech were permissible, she would be more likely to utter it than if 
she faced the risk that it would be illegal. But some who have consid­
ered the matter believe that if this voluntary regime became effec­
tively mandatory, and if speech that did not appear on a preclearance 
list thus became effectively restricted, such a list would become consti­
tutionally suspect.43 The Constitution notwithstanding, we believe that 
the voluntary regime's overall effect is unclear: preclearance could 
lead to less chilling of speech (if it is clearer what is prohibited and 
what is not) but to more control of speech (if it results in greater 
prosecution). 
A second way to reduce uncertainty about how to classify items 
according to particular jurisdictions' categories would be a thesaurus 
that relates the categories of different jurisdictions. Thus, if the sender 
is able to classify an item according to one jurisdiction's categories, it 
could infer the classification in some other jurisdictions. For example, 
it may be that anything classified as child pornography in jurisdiction 
A would be classified as obscene in jurisdiction B, though the converse 
inference might not hold. The thesaurus functions as a more complex 
42 See, e.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 (1972). 
43. See Schauer, supra note 22, at 725-29. The closest case is perhaps Bantam Books v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), where the Court invalidated a "blacklist" Commission. The 
preclearance idea is not quite a blacklist - the result of the submission would be a promise 
not to prosecute, not a determination that the material was "obscene." Again, however, we 
concede that the line is a difficult one to sustain. 
410 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:395 
version of the base jurisdiction model that we described in equation 
(c).44 
B. Recipient Responsible for Not Taking Access 
Our second rule would make the recipient responsible for illegal 
transactions - targeting the buyer, that is, rather than the seller. Un­
der this rule, then, it is the recipient who incurs liability if an improper 
transaction occurs. 
This rule has some advantages over the sender-responsible rule -
the recipient, for example, may be in a better position to know about 
the law of its jurisdiction, and about its own recipient type. But obvi­
ous disadvantages exist as well. The recipient stands in a worse posi­
tion, relative to the sender, to know about the kind of information that 
the sender is making available. While a sender may find it burden­
some to classify its speech according to any given jurisdiction's catego­
ries, at least the sender begins with knowledge about the content of 
the speech at issue.45 The receiver does not. This lack of knowledge 
means that a recipient cannot determine the legality of an exchange 
until after the exchange has occurred. Thus, under a "prohibited un­
less permitted" rule, the receiver risks liabilitt6 in the very act of de­
termining whether a particular exchange complies with the law. And 
under the "permitted unless prohibited" rule, restrictions would likely 
be completely ineffective because the recipient would have a signifi­
cantly reduced incentive to accurately assess the legality of the ex­
change. 
A second problem with placing liability on the receiver results 
from the costs of classification. Because receivers outnumber senders, 
this rule shifts the cost of classification to the many, rather than to the 
few. This cost shift will result in either too much or too little blocking. 
For those who have a strong interest in blocking certain speech, the 
costs of classification will push the classifier to an overly conservative 
strategy. For those who have little interest in blocking certain speech, 
the costs would likely push the classifier not to classify at all. 
Finally, putting the responsibility on the receiver may increase the 
costs of enforcement. Receivers are ordinarily individuals, and there­
fore more difficult to target. Whether this would increase the cost of 
44. See supra Section I.B. 
45. It would be different, of course, if the sender were considered as a bookstore, with­
out knowledge, or any simple way to get knowledge, about the content of its books. See 
Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). We would con­
sider such a "sender" to be an intermediary in our analysis. 
46. This depends upon the level of knowledge required for someone to be guilty under 
such a provision. If the statute were criminal, the knowledge requirement would be quite 
strong, so inadvertent liability would not be possible. But for a lesser prohibition, the 
knowledge requirement may be less. 
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enforcement generally, of course, depends upon whether the alterna­
tive targets - senders or intermediaries - are more easily regulated. 
If they operate primarily from outside the regulating jurisdiction, then 
regulating recipients may be less costly than regulating senders or in­
termediaries. 
1. Sensitivity 
A recipient-responsible rule could be made less costly if there were 
cheaper ways to identify the speech before the transaction. Labels or 
content rating is an obvious solution here. Two sorts of labeling are 
possible. One we have already described - prescreening47 - and 
here the same techniques for reducing the costs of preclearance would 
apply, including the use of automatic text classification and delegation 
of the preclearance powers to an independent third-party rater. As we 
mentioned before, however, there remains a concern about the consti­
tutionality of even a voluntary preclearance regime.48 In the American 
context, despite the reduction in uncertainty, this might constitute a 
prohibited regulatory change. 
The other labeling solution is to rely on senders to label their own 
materials. The labels might directly indicate whether the item is per­
mitted or prohibited to recipients of various ages in particular jurisdic­
tions, or it could describe the item in detail (on dimensions such as 
sex-related) sufficient to infer whether it should be blocked.49 This 
solution simply inverts the certificate solution - here the sender of­
fers a "certificate" upon which the recipient relies, while in the case 
above, it was the recipient providing the certificate upon which the 
sender would rely. The analysis is also analogous. 
Under a "prohibited unless permitted" regime, the labels would 
convey information that the speech is permitted (for example, no sex 
or hate speech). Recipients would receive immunity if they in good 
faith relied upon a sender's labels to determine that access is permit­
ted. Senders would have a natural incentive to provide labels, since 
they would allow more recipients to receive the speech, although pen­
alties for inaccurate labels might be needed to prevent widespread 
mislabeling. There would of course be a transition period, during 
which only a small percentage of materials would carry self-rating la­
bels, rendering most of the Net blocked under a strict "prohibited un­
less permitted" rule. To minimize the transition period, authorities 
47. See supra Section 11.A.1. 
48. See id. 
49. The labels could be expressed in PICS format, see generally Platform for Internet 
Content Selection (last modified Aug. 4, 1999) <http://www. 3.org/PICS/>, or the new RDF 
format, see generally Resource Description Framework (last modified Aug. 9, 1999) 
<http://www. 3.org/RDF>, and distributed along with the items. 
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might publicize well in advance the imposition of such a regime, in the 
hopes that most senders would label before the filtering took effect. It 
is not clear how effective such advance publicity would be, and there 
would probably be a great public outcry during the transition period, 
perhaps enough to cause a reversal of the regulation. 
Under a "permitted unless prohibited" regime, the labels would 
indicate that access to an item was prohibited (to some groups in some 
jurisdictions). The obvious problem here is that the sender would 
have little incentive to label, since that could only reduce legal access.so 
To bolster the effectiveness of this regime, a government might re­
quire senders to provide labels. This may raise a constitutional ques­
tion in the United States if labels were considered compelled speech.st 
Some have argued that they would not,52 but we believe this is a close 
question. To reduce the cost to senders of labeling, a government 
might subsidize third-party ratings or itself produce suggested ratings. 
In the United States, its ratings could not be treated as definitive53 in 
such a system, but they may provide an aid to senders in self-labeling. 
The burden of labels might be minimized by simply requiring la­
bels only where speech is potentially regulable (comparable to re­
quiring that people up to the age of twenty-six carry IDs to purchase 
cigarettes, even though the prohibition reaches only those eighteen 
and under). Even here, however, the requirement raises difficult 
questions, since it would require speech by the sender in the form of a 
label even when the underlying speech is clearly legal in the receiving 
jurisdiction. Thus the most restrictive jurisdiction would in effect de­
termine whether the speaker must label. 
50. If many people voluntarily adopted a "prohibited unless permitted" filter, then the 
market demand for labels might sufficiently encourage sender self-labeling, even if the state 
mandated only the less strict "permitted unless prohibited" regime. For example, consumers 
might turn on the facilities in Microsoft's Internet Explorer (version 3 and higher) or Net­
scape Navigator (version 4.5) to voluntarily block access based on senders' PICS-formatted 
self-labels. 
51. The "compelled speech" doctrine forbids the government from forcing individuals to 
assert the views of the government. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LA w 804-06 (2d ed. 1988) and the cases cited therein. 
52 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755, 
777-98 (1999). 
53. The government's own ratings are not always determinative of whether speech was 
delivered or not, absent a judicial finding. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't 397 
U.S. 728, 738-39 (1970). To force individuals to label their content would, we believe, often 
require them to make judgments about the character of the material they were labeling. But 
the labels in this context are not objective, nor independent of a viewpoint about the nature 
of the material. To have to assert the character of the material, then, can be to require indi­
viduals to make what is in essence a political statement. If a newspaper cannot be forced to 
publish a story it does not otherwise want to print, see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), then neither should a web site be forced to publish a story 
about itself (i.e., that it carries materials of type X) that it does not othenvise want to print. 
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As with recipient certificates, the responsibility for assuring a sup­
ply of sender labels might be assigned to intermediaries, in this case to 
the sender's Internet Access Provider. One important asymmetry ex­
ists, however. While age and jurisdiction are objective properties that 
one might reasonably expect an access provider to verify, correct as­
signment of rating labels to items will involve subjective judgements. 
One intermediate form of responsibility might be to require an access 
provider to assure the availability of some sender self-label, but to 
make only the sender and not the access provider responsible for any 
inaccuracies in the label. 
There is a practical enforcement problem with mandating that 
senders provide labels. Just as it may be difficult to enforce blocking 
requirements across jurisdictional boundaries, it may be difficult for 
authorities in one jurisdiction to enforce a labeling requirement in an­
other. 
C. Intermediary Responsible for Blocking 
We have assumed that the intermediary possesses information 
about neither the recipient nor the item the sender would send. It 
might therefore seem odd to consider the intermediary as a possibly 
responsible actor. 
But intermediaries provide a cheap target of regulation. Fewer of 
them exist than either receivers or senders, and they are typically 
more stable, or harder to move. Just as the government can more eas­
ily regulate telephone companies than it can telephone users, it would 
be easier for the government to set requirements on intermediaries, 
which intermediaries could then enforce upon their customers. More 
importantly, because intermediaries have an interest in reducing the 
cost of compliance, regulating intermediaries will more likely catalyze 
innovation in compliance methods. 
In addition to a lack of information, intermediaries may have lim­
ited capabilities for implementing blocks. Blocking can either be im­
plemented at the application layer (for example, web page requests) 
or at the network layer (for example, individual packets). Whereas 
application layer blocking allows tailored blocking of URLs,54 network 
layer blocks are of necessity much cruder: only the sender's and re­
ceiver's IP addresses and the port number (a rough indicator of 
whether the connection is being used for a web transfer, email, or 
something else) are available. Thus, a network layer block can either 
block all web requests to a particular IP address, or none of them.ss 
54. A URL identifies both a computer to connect to and a path or file name to request. 
Thus, URL blocking enables some files from a Web server to be blocked, while others are 
not blocked. 
55. For a more complete description of application layer and network layer blocking, 
see McCrea et al., supra note 41, at 25-31. 
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· We consider two types of intermediaries. One type provides 
Internet access, such as Internet access or service providers, or even 
employers and schools (for simplicity, we will refer generically to any 
of these as an IAP). It is reasonable to assume that an end-user and 
his or her IAP lie in the same jurisdiction.56 Many, but not all, IAPs 
run proxy servers (and other application layer gateways) which inter­
cept some kinds of Internet traffic. Most commonly, a web proxy at 
an IAP will keep copies in a cache of frequently accessed web pages; 
when a customer requests a cached page, the proxy sends it to the cus­
tomer, without fetching it again from the sender's web server. Proxy 
servers permit application layer blocking: requests for certain URLs 
can be blocked. Moreover, an IAP may configure a firewall that 
forces all requests to use the proxy server. This is done most fre­
quently to enhance corporate security, by restricting the Internet traf­
fic entering and leaving a corporation to only that which passes 
through proxies. In those cases where an IAP does not employ proxy 
servers, however, only cruder network layer blocking is possible. 
The second type of intermediary is a backbone provider, which 
carries data across jurisdictional boundaries. In practice, the IAP may 
also run backbone services, but the services are conceptually distinct 
because they have different technical filtering capabilities. Consider 
the cross-jurisdiction transit point, the place in the backbone pro­
vider's network where data crosses a jurisdictional boundary. Such 
transit points do not normally employ proxy servers or other applica­
tion layer gateways. Thus, only the cruder network layer blocking is 
possible at cross-jurisdiction transit points, given the current Internet 
architecture. 
One final difficulty with blocking by intermediaries is that recipi­
ents may find ways to bypass the blocks, especially if the senders co­
operate. For example, the same prohibited document may be avail­
able from several different URLs, so that a recipient can access one 
even if the others are blocked. A technique known as tunneling, 
where the contents of one packet are wrapped inside another packet, 
may bypass a network layer block.57 
1. Sensitivity 
These architectural features yield the conclusion that intermediar­
ies cannot effectively control access, and given the fundamentality of 
these features, it might seem unadvisable to make changes that would 
increase their ability to control. Because intermediaries are also prac-
56. It would be possible, though expensive, to make an international phone call to ac­
cess an IAP in another jurisdiction. 
57. McCrea et al. detail these and other ways that senders and recipients might bypass 
intermediaries' blocks. See McCrea et al., supra note 41, at 35, 37. 
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tically easier for a jurisdiction to regulate, however, we will consider 
what changes might make this control possible. 
A combination of the architectural changes discussed in previous 
Sections could provide intermediaries with enough information to de­
cide which exchanges to block. That is, information about item types 
could come either from senders' labels or from preclearance lists pro­
vided by jurisdictions. Information about recipient type could come 
from certificates, and information about recipient jurisdiction could 
come either from certificates or from a database lookup on the IP ad­
dress. 
One potential change in the architecture to facilitate the imple­
mentation of blocking would be to require an application layer gate­
way at IAPs or cross-jurisdiction transit points, and to require that all 
customer traffic use these gateways (perhaps enforced via a firewall). 
This would have high costs for Internet flexibility and operation. First, 
it would be computationally expensive to assemble all packets into 
messages at cross-jurisdictional transit points, especially for traffic 
where there is no counteracting performance gain from caching. Sec­
ond, messages may be encrypted for privacy or security purposes (for 
example, in SSL connections) so that even at the application layer 
only crude blocks based on sender and receiver address are possible. 
Third, innovations that introduce new applications would be stifled, 
since the application layer gateways would not initially know about 
the new applications and hence would block them.58 The Internet's 
current architecture has enabled experimentation and rapid deploy­
ment of new applications (examples of applications that blossomed in 
part as a result of this flexibility include the world wide web, push 
services, and ICQ).59 One final cost might come in the form of reli­
ability. It is relatively easy for a service provider to provide multiple 
routers, so that a temporarily disabled router would not interrupt the 
network layer service. It may be more costly to arrange for continued 
service, however, when an application layer gateway is temporarily 
disabled.60 
58. Many corporate firewalls prevent employees from using experimental applications 
that the corporate proxy or gateway is not configured to handle. See WILLIAM R. 
CHEsWICK & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, FIREWALLS AND INTERNET SECURITY: REPELLING 
THE WILY HACKER 76 (1994). 
59. ICQ ("I Seek You") maintains a worldwide registry of users and their status ( online, 
busy, away, etc.), allowing users an easy way to keep track of friends and acquaintances. 
The ICQ client software interacts with the registry updating a user's information and re­
ceiving information about others on that user's "contact list." The ICQ client also acts as a 
platform for chat and other message exchange between any two registered ICQ users. See 
How to Use ICQ (visited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.icq.com/icqtourl>; What Is ICQ? (vis­
ited Sept. 9, 1999) <http://www.icq.com/products/whatisicq.html>. 
60. See McCrea et al., supra note 41, at 31. 
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D. Incentives for Tagging: "Kids" and COPA 
Several of the regimes that we have considered depend on one 
party providing information that another party uses to make its deci­
sion to block. In these situations, the incentives of the information 
provider depend on the default rule recognized by the regulator. A 
blocking rule consistent with the "prohibited unless permitted" re­
quirement creates an incentive (depending upon the regime) for re­
cipients to provide certificates or for providers to label content. To 
make the more permissive "permitted unless prohibited" regime work, 
the regulator must threaten a sufficient punishment to induce the 
needed tagging of information or recipients. 
Regulations designed to protect kids, however, present a special 
case.61 H one assumes that the parent is the relevant "recipient," then 
unlike the general case, the recipient has an incentive to facilitate 
blocking - if, indeed, blocking access is what that parent wants.62 
Sender-based regulations could therefore follow a "permitted unless 
prohibited" regime without restricting recipients who do not identify 
themselves. 
This difference has constitutional significance when one considers 
regulations designed to block access to kids. For example, consider 
one alternative to the regulation prescribed by Congress in CDA and 
COPA - a regulation that would require senders to block only self­
identifying kids, rather than regulation, such as CDA and COPA, that 
required senders to block all receivers except those identified as 
adults. The following hypothetical statute will suggest the idea. 
1. Tamper-Resistant Kids-Mode Browsers ("KMB"). A "kids­
mode" browser is a browser that signals to servers that the user 
is a minor.63 
2. Server Responsibility. When a server detects a kids-mode cli­
ent, it shall (1) block that client from any material properly 
61. They are a special case as well in that, relative to other mandated access control, the 
content here is easier to identify. The model becomes far more complex if content such as 
"defamatory" or "seditious" speech were considered. Likewise, the problem becomes far 
more difficult if the recipient always has an incentive to evade the regulation. Regulating 
"kids" is a special case because, at least sometimes, the parent has an interest in enforcing 
the regulation. 
62. The Court in Reno v. ACLU made it clear that the relevant question is whether par­
ents are enabled in protecting kids, not whether the state is. 521 U.S. 844, 865 & n.31 (1997). 
If a parent decides to give kids access, that decision cannot, for the range of speech being 
discussed here, be overridden by the state. 
63. Manufacturers of browsers and operating systems would presumably make it diffi­
cult to modify the kids-mode configuration without a password. In practice, this would re­
quire both that the kids-mode browser configuration not be easily changed, and that the op­
erating system prevent installation of a fresh browser where the child could choose whether 
to set it in kids-mode. Eventually, we might expect that the kids-mode setting would migrate 
entirely into the operating system, with all browsers' behavior determined by the operating 
system setting. 
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deemed "harmful to minors," and (2) refrain from collecting 
any identification data about the user, except data necessary to 
process user requests (such as IP addresses). Any data col­
lected shall be purged from the system within X days. 
A browser "signals" to a server that its user is a minor in just the 
way the browser now signals its browser type (for example, Microsoft 
Internet Explorer or Netscape Communicator). Under the present ar­
chitecture of the Net, the server "knows" what kind of browser you 
use, the IP address you are browsing from, whether the client will ac­
cept "cookies,"64 and the site you were viewing before you switched to 
that site. The statute would simply tequire that if a browser signaled 
that a user was a kid, then the server would not transmit material 
"harmful to minors." 
The statute imposes burdens, but burdens that are far less signifi­
cant - practically and constitutionally - than the burdens of CDA or 
COPA. The primary practical burden rests upon senders, who must 
now discriminate on the basis of whether the client is a kid. Relative 
to the existing constitutional baseline,65 it would be a trivial change for 
servers to check for the existence of a kids-mode signal. The statute 
does not directly burden software manufacturers, since it simply de­
fines what a "kids-mode browser" is. By requiring servers to respect a 
kids-tag, however, the statute creates an incentive for manufacturers 
to provide such browsers to parents who would want this option. 
Finally, one might believe the statute burdens parents practically 
because they would have to activate the kids-mode browsing. But the 
burden here is not legally significant; it merely consists in the difficulty 
of checking a preference box and keeping a password secret. That, we 
believe, is far less significant than the alternatives, say, of purchasing 
and installing blocking software. 
Compared with the burdens of COP A, we believe this regulation 
would be constitutionally preferred. To see this, one must consider 
the relative burden and effectiveness of the three statutes considered 
here - COPA, CDA, and our proposed statute.66 
COPA was modeled on the CDA, but regulates more narrowly 
than the CDA. Like the CDA, it puts the burden on the speaker to 
64. "Cookies are a general mechanism which server side [sic) connections (such as CGI 
scripts) can use to both store and retrieve information on the client side of the connection. 
The addition of a simple, persistent, client-side state significantly extends the capabilities of 
Web-based client/server applications." Persistent Client State HTTP Cookie, Introduction 
(visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/cookie_spec.html>. See gener­
ally Cookie Central (visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.cookiecentral.com>. 
65. Ginsberg implies that suppliers can be burdened to separate "harmful to minor" 
speech from other speech. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-45 (1968). 
66. This analysis follows the test created by the Supreme Court regarding the constitu­
tionality of speech-restrictive regulations involving the protection of children. See infra note 
80 and accompanying text. 
418 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:395 
avoid speaking improperly to kids. But unlike the CDA, COPA puts 
that burden on a narrow class of speakers, in a narrower zone of the 
Internet. Under COP A, a commercial provider who "knowingly and 
with knowledge of the character of the material . . .  [uses the] World 
Wide Web [to make] available to any minor . . .  material that is harm­
ful to minors" has committed a crime.67 The statute is thus narrower 
in three ways: (1) in the breadth of speech regulated ("harmful to mi­
nors" rather than "indecent"), (2) in the scope of speakers covered (it 
does not reach noncommercial providers), and (3) in the range of the 
Internet affected (it does not reach newsgroups or chat rooms). 
Similarly, the defenses provid�d to a speaker by the statute impose 
lesser burdens than those imposed by CDA. COPA's defenses are 
broader than the defenses under CDA. Under section 231(c)(1) of 
COPA, a provider has a defense if he 
in good faith . . .  restricted access by minors . . .  
(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or 
adult personal identification number; 
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or 
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available 
technology. 68 
Section 231(c)(2) adds immunity from prosecution to this substantive 
defense of section 231(c)(1). It provides that no action can be brought 
against a provider who has in good faith attempted to implement one 
of the defenses from section 231( c )(1).69 
These defenses are thicker than those in CDA. First, the statute 
envisions a form of identification not expressly recognized in the CDA 
- the digital certificate, which as we have described could more 
cheaply and with greater anonymity certify that someone is an adult.70 
Second, the catchall category of technologies ("by any other reason­
able measures that are feasible under available technology"71) is 
broader than the parallel in the CDA. The CDA required that these 
other technologies be "reasonable, effective, and appropriate."72 The 
Supreme Court read this standard not as an ordinary tort standard, 
but as an absolute effectiveness requirement.73 COPA's test, by con­
trast, creates a traditional tort standard: a provider will have a defense 
if he takes those steps reasonable in the circumstances, given the ex­
isting state of technology, whether or not those steps are "effective." 
67. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231{a){l) {Supp. 1999). 
68. 47 U.S.C.A. § 23l{c){l). 
69. See 41 U.S.C.A § 231{c)(2). 
70. See supra Section I.A. 
71. 47 U.S.C.A § 231(c){l). 
72. 47 U.S.C.A § 223(e)(5){A). 
73. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881-82 {1997). 
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These differences evince what Congress purported to accomplish 
- a response to the concerns of the Supreme Court in Reno v. 
ACLU.14 It followed the outline sketched by Justice O'Connor's con­
currence, an outline of what she thought a constitutional regulation 
would be.75 If the Court is eager to reward legislative obedience, it 
might well feel itself compelled to uphold Congress's latest effort. 
But so far, lower courts have not been eager to reward Congress. 
While acknowledging that COP A is less restrictive than CDA, they 
have still concluded that COP A is too burdensome.76 
In our view, this analysis is incomplete. We agree ·with Professor 
Volokh that the question posed by the Supreme Court is not whether 
the regulation is in some absolute sense "too burdensome."77 That 
form of analysis so far has been restricted to abortion regulation78 and 
perhaps also to the dormant commerce clause.79 Rather, the question 
the Supreme Court has asked in this context is whether the regulation 
is more burdensome than needed.80 If that question could be an­
swered by asking whether COP A mandated the least burdensome 
adult-ID regime possible, then we believe this statute does impose the 
smallest adult-ID regime burden possible. 
We believe this because, unlike CDA, COPA includes a catchall 
provision that permits "any other reasonable measures that are feasi­
ble under available technology."81 This clearly invokes traditional 
negligence standards. Whereas CDA required that the technology be 
effective, COP A requires only that it be reasonably effective, given 
the existing technology. In effect, by definition then COPA creates 
the least burdensome adult-ID regime. 
Our proposed regulation, however, creates an even less burden­
some regime. The adult-ID regime is not the only ID regime possible. 
As we outlined at the beginning of this Section, an alternative would 
be a kids-mode-browser regime. By requiring that servers segregate 
based on whether a KMB was signaled, Congress would thereby enact 
a sender-based regulation. This sender-based regulation would be far 
74. See 144 CONG. REC. 139, H9902-11 (1998). 
75. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 887-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). 
76. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (preliminarily enjoining 
COPA). 
77. The "burdensome" test is structurally similar to the test in abortion cases. See 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
78. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833. 
79. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
80. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (plurality permitting 
regulation of "dial-a-porn" to protect kids); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (up­
holding New York statute that required keeping of material harmful to minors from minors). 
81. Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(c)(l)(C) (Supp. 1999). 
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less burdensome than CDA or COPA, however - or indeed any 
adult-ID regime. And, we believe, it would satisfy the second part of 
the Court's test - it would be just as effective.82 
The advantages of the KMB regime are many. 
• First, the burden of signaling that the user is a kid would be far 
less costly than the burden of signaling that the user is an adult be­
cause there would exist no need to verify the signal. An adult ID 
needs to be verified because, by granting access that othenvise 
would not be permitted, there would be an incentive to cheat. A 
KMB, on the other hand, would only block access; there would be 
no incentive to lie. 
• Second, the absolute number of people burdened by the regula­
tion would likely be lower. Rather than requiring an expensive ID 
for every adult wishing full access to the web, only parents who 
want their kids to be blocked from access on the web would have 
to enable the kids mode. The burden here would thus fall on a 
much smaller proportion of the population, and, as described 
above, that burden would be less than the burden of adult IDs. 
• Third, the burden on the parents of obtaining the software to en­
able this blocking is less than the burden of purchasing blocking or 
filtering software. Browsers are (for the moment) free; the district 
court found that the cost of blocking software was approximately 
$40.00.83 
• Fourth, the burden of this regulation falls on browser manufactur­
ers and web sites with "harmful to minors" material. The burden 
on the browser manufacturers is relatively slight; the burden on 
the web sites is the same burden that real space sites bear when 
they distribute such material. We don't mean to minimize these 
costs, but they are less extensive than COPA, and they do not im­
pose any burden on recipients without kids.84 
• Fifth, rather than an elaborate identification system, maintained 
either by companies such as AdultCheck or by content providers, 
this regime would provide only the single unverified assertion that 
the user is a kid. No other personal data would need to be pro­
vided; no compromise of financial information would be risked. 
• Sixth, and relatedly, the cost of providing this identification data is 
far cheaper with the KMB than with the adult-ID system. The 
82 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
83. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
84. Reno v. ACLU indicates quite clearly, we believe, that the state's interest is limited 
to facilitating the choice by parents. See supra note 62. The government in Reno had argued 
that the state had an interest, beyond the interest of parents, to protect kids from speech 
"harmful to minors" even if the parents did not so wish. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), available in 1997 WL 136253, at *19-24 (Mar. 19, 1997). 
But the Court did not embrace this broader restriction. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 865 
& n31. 
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code required to enable the two or three dominant browsers to 
identify users as kids is relatively trivial; the code to protect ano­
nymity with the adult-ID is quite severe because it requires careful 
implementation of cryptography and security features. 
• Seventh, this technique would easily apply to other kid-protective 
regulations. In the very same Act enacting COPA,85 Congress en­
acted the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act.86 That Act 
regulated the data that can be collected from a child online. The 
weakness in that statute is that there is no easy way to identify a 
child. But the change in browsers suggested here would be a way 
to identify a child. 
• Finally, this technique would provide an easy way for schools to 
regulate access to the Net. A common profile for all users in a 
school could be set by a network administrator. That common 
profile would then control the types of sites to which the user 
could gain access. 
These reasons together suggest why this alternative to COP A 
would be less burdensome. That is one half of the Court's test. The 
other half requires that the alternative be "at least as effective."87 
Here again, we believe that it would. 
• First, if the ultimate test is whether the statute enables parents to 
control their children, we believe this alternative would be as ef­
fective as COP A. Of course, parents would be required to set the 
profile for use by kids, but this profile need not be difficult to set. 
Indeed, it would be easier to establish this profile than to establish 
a profile to collect email through a browser, which users already 
do routinely. 
• Second, the kids profile would be easier to implement in places 
where kids are most likely to use the net. Schools could establish a 
common profile for all users within the school and disable the 
ability to build alternative profiles. These locations would then be 
protected locally, while under COPA, they are protected only if 
the kid does not get access to an adult ID. 
• Third, while it is always possible for a child to take steps to evade 
the profile, there is no reason to believe it would be any easier to 
evade a profile than to evade an adult check requirement. The 
simplest way for a child to evade COP A is to steal a credit card 
number, and this is certainly as easy as cracking a security provi-
85. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681. 
86. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2681-728 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506). 
87. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). 
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sion built into a browser.88 Indeed, it may be easier. Whereas a 
KMB would be protected by a password, the blocks of COPA are 
protected by credit card numbers; and while there are plenty of 
places that a credit card number can be found (credit card state­
ments, receipts, etc.), only the careless would leave a password ly­
ing around. 
These considerations suggest that this alternative is at least as ef­
fective as COPA. This is not to say, however, that either would truly 
be effective. Given the flood of sites from jurisdictions beyond the 
United States, any effort to regulate United States web sites would 
seem plainly ineffective. But between the two, we believe the kids­
mode browser dominates COPA and would therefore render COPA 
unconstitutional. 
We consider one final twist to the KMB. Compare the KMB re­
gime that we have described to a quite different, though functionally 
similar, regime. Suppose the responsibilities for tagging and filtering 
were reversed. The sender would be responsible for tagging contents 
according to whether they are prohibited to children, and the kids­
mode browser would block such items. Although this system would 
block exactly the same items as the KMB regime would, a difference 
exists. The difference lies in the information thereby revealed that 
could be used for purposes other than the legally required blocking. 
In the KMB regime that we have described, all senders (even of child­
acceptable materials) would know which receivers were children. This 
could be useful, as mentioned above, in enabling other child protec­
tion regulation; it would also create a risk of other abuse.89 In the al­
ternative we consider here, all receivers would know which materials 
were labeled as inappropriate for children, even those receivers who 
did not signal themselves as children. Thus, these two regimes that 
have the same immediate consequences might have quite different 
secondary effects. One produces information for the servers; the 
other produces information for the surfer. 
III. SECONDARY CONSEQUENCES 
As we said at the start, our aim in this Article extends beyond 
COP A to any attempt to regulate access that does not fully consider 
the costs. In this Section, we extend our analysis of these costs to a 
88. One possible way to evade the limitation would be for a kid to download another 
browser and set it up to be free of the kids-ID restriction. But this possibility could be ad­
dressed. Again, the browser manufacturers could easily segregate download locations, based 
on whether the browser making the request were kids-ID enabled. If it were kids-ID en­
abled, then the company would download a kids-ID set browser only. Alternatively, the 
kids-ID could be enabled in the operating system {"OS"), making substitution of an adult 
OS for a kids OS significantly more difficult. 
89. See infra Part III. 
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category of costs that we believe have not fully been reckoned in the 
debate so far. These costs, in the end, may well be more significant 
than the costs of the "problem" that access controls seek to remedy. 
In our analysis so far, we have considered three techniques for 
regulating access - tagging the sender, tagging the recipient, and 
regulating the intermediary to help effect either of the two taggings. 
All three strategies, we suggest, have effects that reach beyond their 
primary objective. All three envision a general infrastructure that can 
be used for purposes beyond those initially intended. This potential, 
we believe, should also be counted when reckoning the cost of a given 
regulatory strategy. 
A. IDs and Regulability 
To effect sender or intermediary control, we envisioned the devel­
opment of identity certificates designed to facilitate the credentialling 
of certain facts about a recipient - how old that person is, where she 
is from, etc. We also proposed the development of a database that 
maps IP addresses to jurisdictions. 
But it should be clear that if these architectures were enabled for 
this speech-regulating purpose, they would both have uses that extend 
well beyond this purpose alone. That is, these architectures might fa­
cilitate other jurisdiction-based regulation or access control imposed 
on senders, beyond the narrow purposes that motivated the initial 
change. We might make the Net safe for kids, but in consequence 
make it a fundamentally regulable space. 
How? Certificates or IP databases would facilitate a more general 
structure of jurisdiction-based control, including taxation and privacy 
regulations. The reason is straightforward. Local jurisdictions have 
the legal authority to regulate their own, both while the citizens are at 
home and while they are away.90 A certificate-rich Internet could fa­
cilitate the identification of who could be regulated by whom, or what 
standards could be imposed upon whom. And this, in turn, could fa­
cilitate a more general regulation of behavior in cyberspace. 
We might imagine a scheme that looks something like this. States 
would enter a compact whereby they, as home jurisdictions, agree to 
require senders or intermediaries, within their own jurisdictions, to re­
spect the rules of other jurisdictions, in exchange for senders or inter­
mediaries in other jurisdictions reciprocating. These rules would 
specify the restrictions imposed on citizens from a given jurisdiction, 
90. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(2) & cmt. e.(1987) For 
example, the Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (Supp. I 1995), crimi­
nalizes traveling abroad to engage in illegal sexual acts with children. For an interesting dis­
cussion of this provision, see Margaret A. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists at Home: 
Do Laws in Sweden, Australia, and the United States Safeguard the Rights of Children as 
Mandated by International Law?, 18 FORDHAM lNT'LL.J. 1852, 1902-12 (1995). 
424 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 98:395 
and the range of citizens for whom the restriction applies. For exam­
ple, a jurisdiction might specify that its citizens may not engage in 
Internet gambling; the jurisdiction within which a gambling server sits, 
then, would require the server to check for a person's citizenship, and 
condition access based on whether they held the proper credential. 
And presumably the jurisdiction would do this only if there were re­
strictions that it wanted imposed in other places and that it needed 
other jurisdictions to respect. 
Thus, if a jurisdiction database or a credential-rich Internet were in 
place, we might expect voluntary uses of that infrastructure to prolif­
erate, although with differing degrees of desirability. Some voluntarily 
imposed restrictions might seem reasonable. For example, recording 
companies might refuse access to their web sites from countries where 
pirated copies of intellectual property were rampant. Other voluntary 
uses might not have such sanguine effects. For example, some Serbs 
and Croats might refuse to allow each other access to their web pages. 
In both cases, the certificate infrastructure would enable a form of dis­
crimination. 
Not every ID architecture, however, would effect this increase in 
private regulability. Obviously, the more data a certificate architec­
ture transmits, the more regulability increases. Likewise, an ID archi­
tecture with a narrow focus on children, like the KMB, would facilitate 
very little regulation beyond regulation protecting kids. This, by the 
way, constitutes a second, and we believe, compelling reason to prefer 
it over the adult-ID regulation of COPA; for if the government has 
two means available for protecting kids, we believe it should select the 
means that produce the least significant secondary effects, unless there 
is some analysis showing that the secondary effects also advance some 
legitimate government claim. 
B. Labels and Improper Control 
The other general solution we have identified for effecting man­
dated access control relies upon labels, designed to facilitate filtering 
by recipients or intermediaries. The labels might be provided by 
senders or by governments in the form of preclearance lists. But as 
should be obvious, an inexpensive and widely used labeling infrastruc­
ture would have its own secondary impacts, including the possibilities 
of more widespread speech regulation and of voluntary individual or 
collective uses of labels for blocking beyond the state's legitimate in­
terest. 
First, if available speech labels describe categories beyond those 
that a jurisdiction would normally regulate, the mere availability may 
tempt regulation within these new categories. Thus, the \videspread 
use of a general labeling infrastructure may start governments on a 
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slippery slope toward regulating all sorts of speech, even if the initial 
impetus for labeling is limited to only a few kinds of speech.91 
Second, labels might be used for voluntary access controls as well 
as mandated access controls.92 That is, recipients or intermediaries 
might choose to block more exchanges than governments require. 
Parents in the United States, for example, may choose to block young 
children's access to hate speech or speech about sex education, even 
though such speech is legal for children in the United States. Alter­
nately, a search engine may provide a filtered search service that, 
when queried for "toys," returns links to pages describing children's 
toys rather than sex toys, without necessarily reporting that certain 
sites have been blocked.93 
The availability of voluntary access controls to parents and teach­
ers is widely viewed as socially beneficial, since it gives control to peo­
ple who can tailor restrictions to individual and local needs. In a 
world of perfect transparency and competition, such control imposed 
by IAPs or search engines may be unproblematic. 
But in practice, a number of reasons suggest that these access con­
trols might be less than ideal. 
• First, consumers may have a hard time determining which blocks 
are in their own best interest, as the criteria for selection may not 
be transparent or readily understandable.94 
• Second, even if the criteria were transparent, the present architec­
ture would still allow filtering "upstream" (for example, by a 
search engine) without the consumer knowing (thus a nontrans­
parency not about the rating, but about who is effecting the fil­
ter ).95 
• Third, individuals may face a social dilemma about whether to 
adopt filters. Individuals may themselves prefer to have filtered 
content (to perfect their own choice), but not want society to have 
filtered content (to preserve social diversity).96 If everyone can 
91. Obviously, the most significant concern here would be jurisdictions outside of the 
United States or outside of places where a strong free speech right exists. The norms that 
the United States sets for the Net, however, would certainly spill over into those places and 
our view is that this spillover ought to be reckoned in any regulatory regime. 
92. In fact, voluntary access controls were the main motivation for the creation of PICS. 
93. For a demonstration of Alta Vista's "Family Filter," using ratings from SurfWatch, 
click on the Family Filter link at <http://www.altavista.com/> (visited Sept. 17, 1999). For a 
discussion of the implications, see Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS Comm. 
& Ent. L.J. 453 (1997). 
94. See Rikki McGinty, Safety Online: Will It Impede Free Speech?, MEDIA DAILY, 
Dec. 5, 1997. 
95. Cf. Weinberg, supra note 93, at n.108. 
96. See CASS R SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 21-23 
(1995). 
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easily satisfy their individual preference for filtering, the collective 
preference for social diversity may be ignored. 
• Fourth, the very act of labeling can have destructive consequences 
for the evolution of ideas, at least if those labels are exclusive in 
form or in fact. As Niva Elkin-Koren describes, one great virtue 
of the Internet is its democratization of the process for drawing 
categories.97 Rather than labels imposed by a librarian, search en­
gines allow the users to construct different ways of pulling the ma­
terial together. 
• Finally, if IAPs bundle filters with service, then the choice among 
filters might be less robust than ideal. Put another way, in prac­
tice, the competition among filters may not be sufficiently diverse. 
This could yield very broad filters, which, if common, could create 
secondary impacts on the variety of speech available on the Inter­
net - since senders may tailor their speech to what will pass the 
filters. 
These secondary effects - a slippery slope of regulation and po­
tentially chilling voluntary uses of labels - have led one of the 
authors previously to describe PICS, which provides the technical in­
frastructure for labeling, as "the devil. "98 The other author (one of the 
developers of PICS) believes that the net impact of a widespread la­
beling infrastructure would be positive, because of the many positive 
voluntary uses.99 
But whether one supports labels for these secondary uses or not, 
we both acknowledge that the consequence of these labels is the ena­
bling of this secondary use. And if one were sufficiently troubled by 
this secondary use - as for example the ACLU and other civil rights 
organizations are100 - then this secondary consequence might well af­
fect one's judgment about whether a law mandating KMB is prefer­
able to a world with private labels. In other words, if part of the moti­
vation for private labels comes from the need to protect kids, that 
motivation would be undermined if there were other ways to protect 
kids. 
97. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to 
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO AR.TS & ENT. L.J. 215, 238-40 {1996). 
98. Lawrence Lessig, Tyranny in the Infrastructure, WIRED, July 1997, at 96. 
99. See Paul Resnick, Filtering Information on the Internet, SCI. AM., March 1997, at 62; 
PICS, Censorship, & Intellectual Freedom FAQ {Paul Resnick, ed.) {last modified Aug. 4, 
1999) <http://www. 3.org/PICS/PICS-FAQ-980126.html>. 
100. See Ann Beeson & Chris Hansen, Fahrenheit 451.2: ls Cyberspace Burning? How 
Rating and Blocking Proposals May Torch Free Speech on the Internet (visited Oct. 5, 1999) 
<http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/burning.html>. 
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IV. EMAIL SPAM CONTROLS 
We now turn our attention to controls on the distribution of spam 
email.101 On the surface, the problem of spam may seem quite differ­
ent from those we have considered earlier. With spam the incentives 
of the recipients and the regulator are aligned (neither wants the 
spam). Only the sender has a contrary interest. 
Our model of mandated access controls, however, applies equally 
well. Regulations in both cases define some information exchanges as 
blocked. They also must define which parties carry the responsibility 
for providing the information necessary to enable that blocking. The 
effectiveness of any regime will depend on the ability of the responsi­
ble parties to comply (especially whether the party responsible for 
blocking has sufficient information to decide which items to block) 
and on the enforceability of the regulations (especially the ability to 
reach senders and intermediaries in other jurisdictions). 
The sensitivity analysis for spam controls is also analogous to the 
analysis of access controls. For example, various architectural changes 
could make recipient type and jurisdiction information available to 
senders. Since email transmission protocols do not involve a two-way 
communication session between sender and receiver,102 recipients 
would have to preregister their types and jurisdictions with some 
server that senders would check with prior to sending mass mailings. 
If the sender cannot determine a recipient's type and jurisdiction, the 
default may be either to permit or prohibit sending. A "permitted 
unless prohibited" regime would be similar to current "opt out" lists 
for which people can now register. Senders, however, would be re­
quired to use these lists, either by sending their spam through a re­
mailer that excludes those on the list, or by checking their recipients 
against the list.103 As with other schemes for tagging people, secon­
dary effects exist that we should account for here. For example, this 
system could facilitate the use of opt-out lists for other purposes, or 
the use of the registry infrastructure to facilitate creation of other lists. 
Alternately, senders may be required to label their messages if 
they are spam (according to the definitions of various jurisdictions) to 
enable either mandated or voluntary filtering by intermediaries or re-
101. Spam is defined roughly as unsolicited co=ercial email. Various proposed regu­
lations have grappled with how to operationalize this definition. For an excellent analysis, 
see ALAN SCHWARTZ & SIMSON GARFINKEL, STOPPING SPAM: STAMPING OUT UN­
WANTED EMAIL AND NEWS POSTINGS (1998). 
102. In email transmission protocols such as SMTP, there is no preliminary end-to-end 
session set up that would enable the recipient to send a certificate indicating its jurisdiction 
or type. Email transmission is effectively a one-way co=unication. 
103. This is the essence of one part of Senator Robert Torricelli's Electronic Mailbox 
Protection Act of 1997, S. 875, 105th Cong. 
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cipients.104 And here also possible secondary effects exist - for ex­
ample, the use of spam tags for other purposes (such as monitoring 
what employees receive), or added pressure to label for other criteria 
(such as sex or politics). 
One essential difference between spam controls and access con­
trols is that recipients do not want to receive spam, but some people 
may want to receive obscene or other materials over which govern­
ments may mandate access controls. Thus it is not necessary to man­
date that spam recipients filter out certain messages or that they reveal 
their type and jurisdiction. Recipients will do so voluntarily if it will 
reduce spam. Hence, sender blocking under a "permitted unless pro­
hibited" regime may be more effective for spam control than for ac­
cess controls. Where intermediaries carry the blocking responsibili­
ties, however, mandates may be necessary. Otherwise, spam senders 
may pay intermediaries enough to make them prefer not to filter. 
Any regulations of sender behavior suffer from the same jurisdic­
tional problems that plague efforts to mandate access controls. A 
small country may refuse to enforce other countries' regulations on its 
senders and thus become a spam haven. One possible solution would 
place the responsibility on intermediaries not to forward improper 
email (either spam or untagged spam, depending on the regulation). 
If most jurisdictions imposed such a regulation, it would put pressure 
on intermediaries in other jurisdictions to voluntarily impose similar 
restrictions, else they would not be able to pass messages to restrictive 
jurisdictions. If, however, not enough jurisdictions imposed such a 
regulation, there could be an overall loss of email connectivity, which 
would be inconvenient for legitimate users. 
These phenomena have already occurred as a result of voluntary 
attempts by IAPs to restrict spam. Some large IAPs have refused to 
accept email originating from servers that are known spam sources 
(they may also be sources of legitimate email). This results in irate 
customers of both IAPs who resultantly cannot communicate non­
spam messages to each other. The hope is that these irate customers 
will pressure the spam source to mend its ways, and this pressure has 
indeed been effective on occasion.105 
• 
Given the difficulties and potential side effects of mandated spam 
controls, it is worth exploring architectural changes to enable volun­
tary access controls. Monetary filtering presents one intriguing possi-
104. Without sender tagging, automated filtering is still possible, but will never be com­
pletely accurate at separating spam from non-spam messages. This is the essence of Senator 
Frank Murkowski's Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Choice Act of 1997, S. 771, 
105th Cong. 
105. See SCHW AR1Z & GARFINKEL, supra note 101, at 85-93. 
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bility. A message sender would attach some ecash to each message.106 
If the recipient is unhappy about having received a message, she can 
keep the money. Each recipient would have a filter automatically re­
ject messages with insufficient money attached, with the sender being 
notified of the minimum amount required to get the message through. 
If widely adopted, this scheme would set up market incentives to vol­
untarily curtail sending of unwanted messages. 
But here again, the secondary consequences are crucial. The 
spam-stamp could constrain noncommercial speech as much as com­
mercial speech. It would restrict political messages as well as nonpoli­
tical messages. Thus how one changes the architecture to solve the 
problem of spam will have effects far beyond the problem of spam. 
Our point has been to highlight these effects, and to argue that they 
must be accounted in any decision to regulate. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has proposed an abstract model of mandated access 
controls, and it has applied that model to two concrete cases. The 
model includes three types of actors: senders, intermediaries, and re­
cipients. Control decisions are based on three types of information: 
the item, the recipient's jurisdiction, and the recipient's type. 
With the architecture of today's Internet, senders are ignorant of 
the recipient's jurisdiction and type, recipients are ignorant of an 
item's type, and intermediaries are ignorant of both. It is easy to see, 
then, why, with today's Internet architecture, governments are having 
a hard time mandating access controls. Any party on whom responsi­
bility might be placed has insufficient information to carry out that re­
sponsibility. 
While the Internet's architecture is relatively entrenched, it is not 
absolutely immutable. Our abstract model suggests the types of 
changes that could enhance regulability. Senders could be given more 
information about recipient jurisdiction and type, either through re­
cipients providing certificates, or through a database mapping IP ad­
dresses to jurisdictions. Recipients could be given more information 
about item types, either through senders providing labels or through 
government preclearance lists of permitted or prohibited items. 
Table 1 summarizes this sensitivity analysis. Since the two inter­
ventions are analogous, the analyses of their costs and effectiveness 
are analogous as well. In either case, there will be a natural incentive 
to provide information if the default action of the responsible party is 
to block access unless the information is provided (a "prohibited un-
106. Ecash is simply a digital object that could be attached, as a file is, to an email mes­
sage. For a discussion of ecash, see David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, SCI. AM., 
Aug. 1992, at 96, 96-97. 
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less permitted" regime). Otherwise, there will be no natural incentive, 
and the government will have to require the provision of that informa­
tion. 
TABLE 1: SENSITIVITY TABLE 
Sender Intermediary Recipient 
Missing • jurisdiction • jurisdiction • content of item 
information • recipient type • recipient type 
• content of item 
Possible architec- • IP to geography As for sender and • preclearance 
tural and legal mapping, jurisdic- recipient, plus: • sender's self-
changes tion certificates • responsibility to rating 
• recipient-type assure � third-party rat-
certificates sender/recipient mg 
• preclearance, compliance 
thesauri • use of proxies 
and application 
gateways 
Consequences Enables general Enables private Enables greater 
regulability of be- parties (IAPs and control of speech 
havior on the Net ISPs) to regulate content on the 
based on recipient behavior on the Net beyond that 
type and jurisdic- Net initially required 
ti on by governments 
Notes Enforcement Enforcement is Enforcement 
problems signifi- easier: since IAPs problem: number 
cant, if sender are not mobile, of recipients leads 
outside the juris- there are few to selective en-
diction players, and they forcement, 
have commercial though a greater 
assets portion of the 
regulable public is 
within a given ju-
risdiction 
The secondary effects of these two infrastructures are also analo­
gous, but quite different. The by-product of a certificate regime is a 
general ability to regulate based on jurisdiction and recipient charac­
teristics, even for issues beyond content control, such as taxation and 
privacy. Such a regime also enables senders voluntarily to exclude re­
cipients based on jurisdiction or type, a facility which might be used 
for negative as well as positive purposes. The by-product of a widely 
used labeling infrastructure is a general ability to regulate based on 
item characteristics, even characteristics that governments have no le-
November 1999] Zoning Speech 431 
gitimate reason to regulate. Such a regime also enables intermediaries 
and recipients to exclude voluntarily some item types, a facility that 
may empower parents and teachers but may also be overused if it is 
poorly understood or difficult to configure. 
If intermediaries have responsibility for blocking, they will need 
both types of information. In addition, architectural changes will be 
necessary to enable application layer blocking of individual items 
rather than cruder network layer blocking of all traffic from or to an 
IP address. A requirement of application layer blocking, however, in­
troduces significant costs in terms of openness to innovation and vul­
nerability to hardware and software failures. Intermediaries, then, ar­
guably constitute the most costly party upon which to impose 
responsibility. On the other hand, they are the most easily regulated, 
since there are fewer of them, they are more stable, they have assets, 
and their governing jurisdictions are clear. 
While our sensitivity analysis does suggest consequences that 
might not have been readily seen, our ultimate conclusion is one oth­
ers have reached as well. It will be difficult for governments to man­
date access controls for the Internet. Given today's architecture, any 
such mandates would of necessity be draconian or ineffective. 
Changes to the technical infrastructure or social practices could en­
hance regulability, although such changes would both entail direct 
costs and create secondary by-products whose value is debatable. 
Given the significant costs of any such architectural change, govern­
ments must answer the fundamental question regarding the impor­
tance of such changes - perhaps a lessening of governments' tradi­
tional power to control the distribution of harmful information would 
be preferable. 
